Ideas from 'The Nature of Mental States' by Hilary Putnam [1968], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind Language and Reality: Papers vol 2' by Putnam,Hilary [CUP 1975,0-521-10668-5]].

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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

2590	Dispositions need mental terms to define them

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique

2591	Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

2592	Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour

2589	Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions

2588	Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism

2587	Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

6376	Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger]

2330	If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Kim]